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Economic and Social Impact of the
DefenseSector
IN HIS FAMOUS farewell address, President Eisen-
hower warned the nation to remain vigilant of what he called
"the military-industrial complex." This warning needs to be re-
membered and pondered by thoughtful citizens. An age of
nuclear weapons leaves no time for assembling the military
and industrial forces needed to repel an aggressor. Once a na-
lion is attacked, it can be practically destroyed in a matter of
minutes. For this reason, as well as because of the unhappy
state of our relations with the Communist bloc, "normalcy" for
us has come to include since 1950 a formidable military estab-
lishment in a state of constant readiness, if need be, for war.
But "the conjunction of an immense military establishment
and a large arms industry," as President Eisenhower has ob-
sewed, "is new in the American experience. The total influence
—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every
statehouse, every office of the Federal government." My pur-
pose today is to consider with you some of the ways in which
the emergence of a massive and permanent defense sector has
Moskowitz Lecture at New York University, Nov. 20, 1961,originally
published in TheDefense Sectorand the American Economy, New York
University Press, 1968. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.314The Business Cycle in a Changing World
already changed and is continuing to change oureconomicand
social life.
I
To begin with, the defense sector has revolutionized govern-
mental finances in our generation. In fiscal year 1948, federal
expenditures came to $36 billion. In fiscal 1964, well before
Vietnam became a significant financial burden, spending on
national defense alone amounted to $54 billion, or half as
much again as the total budget in 1948. In the current fiscal
year, the defense budget may amount to about $80 billion, but
this huge sumstilldoes not indicate the full financial cost of
defense activities. The federal government expects to spend
another $5 billion on international programs and also $5.25 bil-
lion on space research and technology. These activities, of
course, are mainly pursued in the interests of our national
security. Moreover, the federal budget allows $10.5 billion for
interest on the public debt and over $6.5 billion for veterans'
benefits, the former being preponderantly and the latter en-
tirely a legacy of past wars. Thus, defense-related expenditures
will probably come this year to over $100 billion—a sum that
represents more than $500 for eveiy man, woman, and child of
our population.
The large and rising cost of defense activities would have
caused financial problems even if other costs of government
had not changed. In fact, as we all know, the range of govern-
mental activities has greatly increased. Since the end of World
War II, the American people have come to expect their gov-
ernment to maintain economic conditions that are generally
conducive to full employment. The federal government has
been also under increasing pressure to enlarge social services—
that is to say, improve the nation's schools, help support uni-Economic & Social impact of Defense Sector315
versities,improve hospitals and medical facilities, facilitate
home ownership, reduce urban slums, promote safer and faster
air travel, raise social security and related welfare benefits,
train manpower for the needs of industry, seek ways of reduc-
ing air and water pollution, and even concern itself with prob-
len-is of traffic congestion and police protection. These expand-
ing interests of the federal government are a political response
to the increasing urbanization of modem life, the new oppor-
turiities opened up by advances in technology, and the grow-
ing impatience for better living on the part of many citizens
who have been left behind by the march of progress. Thus, at
the very stage of history when demographic, technological,
and political trends have been releasing powerful forces to
raise the costs of government, the defense sector likewise be-
came an increasing burden on the Treasury. The inevitable
result has been a vast growth of federal spending—from $36
billion in fiscal 1948 to $120 billion in 1964, and probably $175
billion, if not more, this fiscal year.
The upsurge of federal spending on defense and on civilian
activities has naturally resulted in much higher taxes. To be
sure, we have recently become accustomed to deficits when the
economy is booming as well as when the economy is de-
pressed. The role of deficits in governmental finance, however,
is commonly exaggerated. From mid-1946 to June, 1967, the
cumulative revenue of the federal government covered aU but
2 per cent of its expenditures, so that federal taxes have in fact
grown just about as rapidly as expenditures. Our economy has
also grown substantially during this period, but not enough to
prevent taxes from siphoning off an increasing portion of the
national income. In fiscal 1940, federal revenues came to about
7 per cent of the gross national product, in 1950 to 15.5 per
cent, in 1960 to 19 per cent, last year to 20 per cent. Mean-
while, state and local taxes have also moved up—indeed, they316TheBusinessCycle in a Changing World
have grown even more rapidly during the past ten or twenty
years than federal taxes. According to the national income ac-
counts, the combined revenue ofall governmental units
amounted in the past fiscal year to about 29 per cent of the
gross national product and 32 per cent of the net national
product; and even the higher figure may understate the tax
burden, since it makes inadequate allowance for the capital
used up in the process of producing goods and services.
This year, with the war in Vietnam escalating and social ex-
penditures also rising, the federal budget deficit may well
exceed $20 billion unless steps are taken to raise taxes and curb
expenditures. To reduce the enormous deficit now in sight,
President Johnson has proposed a 10 per cent surcharge on in-
come taxes, but the Congress has thus far failed to adopt the
proposal. Some members of Congress feel that the tax burden
is already so heavy that it would be wiser to cut governmental
expenditures than to raise taxes. Others would be willing to ac-
cept higher taxes provided substantial reductions in expendi-
tures were simultaneously made. With financial markets dis-
turbed and interest rates rising above last year's abnormally
high level, a great debate is now raging both within and out-
side governmental circles about the relation of the federal
budget to economic activity, interest rates, and inHation. What
is critically at issue in this debate is not whether federal spend-
ing should be permitted to rise, but the size of the reduction—
if any—in the projected scale of spending on nondefense pro-
grams. No matter how this issue is resolved, spending in the
aggregate will still go up, and—if history is any guido—taxes
will follow; so that we now face the prospect of higher income
taxes besides higher social security taxes and assorted increases
of state and local taxes.
We also face the prospect of paying more for foodstuffs,
clothing, automobiles, and whatever else we buy. The causesEconomic & Social Impact of Defense Sector317
of inflation are complex, and it is never strictly true that an in-
crease in spending on defense or on business equipment or on
any other category is the sole cause of inflation. In principle,
the government can always adjust its monetary and fiscal poli-
cies to economic conditions so as to keep the price level rea-
sonably stable. If the government had foreseen how rapidly
the cost of the Vietnam war would mount and if it had taken
promptly the restraining measures needed to keep the aggre-
gate demand for goods and services from outrunning the na-
tion's capacity to produce, the new round of inflation that we
have experienced since 1964 could have been prevented. But if
we blame the government for its lack of foresight or courage in
this instance, we should also bear in mind that the theoretical
ideal of price stability has rarely, if ever, been closely approx-
imated under wartime conditions.
When demand presses hard on a nation's resources, as it
generally does at a time of war, it becomes very difficult to ad-
just tax, credit, and expenditure policies on the scale needed to
prevent advances in the price level. The doubling of wholesale
prices between 1940 and 1950 was obviously linked to the
enormous expansion of military spending during World War
II. Since then, the trend of prices has continued upward at a
much slower pace, and no single factor stands out so promi-
nently among the causes of inflation. Indeed, prices have risen
less in our country since 1950 than in most others, despite our
exceptionally large military burden. It is nevertheless true that
the greater part of the recent advance in both wholesale and
consumer prices came in three spurts—between 1950 and 1952
when the Korean war was raging, between 1955 and 1957
when a fairly rapid increase of military contracts for newly
developed weapon systems paralleled a booming trend of
business investment in new plant and equipment, and since
mid-1965 when our ground forces shifted to an active role in318The Business Cycle in a Changing World
Vietnam.It thus appears that the sudden surges within the
defense sector have contributed to the inflationary trend which
has been gradually eroding all savings accumulated in the
form of bank deposits, life insurance, savings bonds, and other
fixed-income assets, besides complicating life for everyone
whose money income fails to respond to the rising cost of liv-
ing.
The defense sector has also contributed to the deficit in our
balance of payments. Since 1950 the receipts from our sale of
goods, services, and securities to foreign countries have run
considerably below the sums that we need to pay foreign
countries. One reason for this persistent deficit is the large ex-
penditure that is required, year in and year out, to maintain
our military forces abroad. Foreign assistance programs have
also been adding to the deficit, although their foreign exchange
cost is now much smaller. Since the revenue derived from our
foreign transactions has been insufficient to cover the required
payments, our stocks of gold have shrunk from $24.5 billion at
the beginning of 1950 to about $13 billion at present. Mean-
while, the dollar balances that are held here by foreigners have
also grown, so that the United States finds itself in the position
of a banker whose short-term liabilities are steadily rising
while his reserves keep dwindling. In order to check the de-
terioration in our international financial position, the Depart-
ment of Defense has lately been favoring domestic over for-
eign suppliers even at cost differentials of 50 per cent. More
disturbing still, the government has found it necessary to im-
pose restrictions on the outflow of capital—an interference
with private investment that is contrary to our national tradi-
tions. Even so, the deficit in the balance of payments has per-
sisted, and—at least partly as a result of the war in Vietnam—
it is larger this year than last. International confidence in the
dollar, which is of such immense importance to America'sEconomic & Social Impact of Defense Sector319
politicalleadership as well as to our economy and that of the
rest of the world, is still strong, but we can no longer count on
it as we did ten or twenty years ago.
II
I have been concerned thus far with the financial aspects of
national defensc—its impact on governmental expenditures,
taxes, the price level, and the balance of payments. Financial
transactions and the price system, however, are merely mecha-
nisms for putting a nation's resources to work and for distribut-
ing what is produced among people and their government.
The resources that we devote to national defense are not avail-
able for making consumer goods or for adding to the stock of
industrial equipment or for public uses in the sphere of educa-
tion, health, or urban redevelopment. To the extent that we
allocate labor, materials, and capital to national defense, we
cannot satisfy our desires for other things. The civilian goods
and services that are currently foregone on account of expendi-
tines on national defense are, therefore, the current real cost of
the defense establishment.
This cost has become very large, as my observations on gov-
ernmental finance have already suggested. Its magnitude can
perhaps be grasped best by considering the amount of labor
devoted to national defense. In fiscal 1965, the armed forces
numbered close to 2.75 million. They were supported by over
900,000 civilian workers attached to the Department of De-
fense and by another 2.1 million civilians employed in private
industry who worked, directly or indirectly, on military sup-
plies. Thus the total employment on defense goods and ser-
vices amounted to 5.75 million, or to 86 out of every 1,000 em-
ployed workers in the country. Two years later—that is, during
the fiscal year which ended June, 1967—the number was320The Business Cycle in a Changing World
nearly 7.5 million, or 103 out of every 1,000employedworkers.
The employment currently attributable to national security
expenditures is still larger; for the figures that I have cited,
besides not being fully up to date, take no account of the activ-
ities of the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration, or other defense-related
efforts.
A mere count of numbers, moreover, does not convey ade-
quately the drain ,of the defense establishment on the nation's
work force. Men differ in quality, and we need to take account
of the fact that those involved in the defense effort are, on the
average, superior from an economic viewpoint to workers en-
gaged in civilian production. Military technology and opera-
tions have become very sophisticated in our times. The armed
forces now have a highly skilled core and are very selective in
accepting men for service. Indeed, the proportion of personnel
who completed high school is much larger in the armed forces
than in the comparable age group of the civilian population,
while the proportion of college graduates is not materially
lower. Training and skill count even more heavily among the
civilians involved in defense activities. Last year, professional
workers accounted for nearly 16 per cent and skilled blue-
collar workers for 21 per cent of the civilians employed on
defense work, in contrast to about 13 per cent for each of these
groups in the total working population. One out of every five
of the nation's electrical and mechanical engineers in civilian
jobs, two out of every five airplane mechanics, two out Of
every five physicists outside of teaching, and three out of every
five aeronautical engineers were employed on defense goods
during the past year. And even these figures understate the
skill dimension of defense employment, for they again leave
out of account the highly technical activities originating in the
Atomic Energy Commission and the Space Administration.Economic & Social Impact of Defense Sector321
Theheavy emphasis on skill and brainpower in defense em-
ployment reflects, of course, the explosion of military technol-
ogy to which modem science has been contributing so much of
its finest energy. Since the Korean war, defense contractors
have been devoting themselves not only to the production of
extremely complex weapons but also to developing entirely
new weapon systems that no one as yet knew how to produce.
Much of the defense sector of our economy has come to con-
sist, therefore, of research and development work. The Presi-
dent's budget for this fiscal year, for example, allots about $16
billion to research and development, of which $9 billion is to
be devoted to defense and another $5 billion to space activi-
ties. Since 1960 defense and space programs have consistently
accounted for over 80 per cent of the rapidly increasing federal
funds devoted to research and development. More important
still, they have amounted to about 54 per cent of the expendi-
ture on research and development carried out in the entire
nation—that is, by the federal government, industry, universi-
ties and colleges, research centers affiliated with universities,
and other nonprofit institutions. During the 1950's the propor-
tion of the nation's research and development effort devoted to
defense-related activities was only a little lower.
By diverting to its interest so much manpower, especially
scientific and engineering skills, the defense establishment has
left its mark on both the structure and the functioning of our
economy. The effects are all around us. Some defense-oriented
industries—notably, the aerospace group, electronics, and com-
munications—have become a major factor in the economy, and
their development has favored many communities—for exam-
ple, Los Angeles, San Diego, Seattle, Baltimore. Some large
firms have acquired marvelous technological competence from
their work on defense or space contracts and this rather than
any immediate profit has commonly been their chief reason for322The Business Cycle in a Changing World
wanting the contracts in the first place. Not a few of the scien-
fists and engineers who received their training in the more
sophisticated enterprises have moved into traditional lines of
activity, bringing something of the spirit of research and inno-
vation with them. Many of the men released by the armed
forces have been able to put the technical skills acquired dur-
ing their military service to effective use in civilian jobs. Non-
defense activities have shared in the increased supply of
engineers, scientists, and technicians that has been stimulated
by the defense-related demand. And not a few of the processes
or products developed for the military have found application
in civilian 11k—for example, jet transports, advanced compu-
ters,radar, miniaturized components, and nuclear power
plants.
But if the defense sector has stimulated economic develop-
ment in some directions,it has retarded growth in others.
Many civilian-oriented laboratories of business firms have
found it difficult to match the salaries or the equipment that
subsidized defense firms offer to scientists and engineers. Re-
search and development work in behalf of new products and
processes for the civilian economy has therefore been handle
capped. Small firms have derived little benefit from military or
space contracts. The draft has added to the labor turnover of
all businesses, large and small. The lack of opportunity in the
defense sector for poorly educated and unskilled workers has
not helped the rural Negroes who have flocked into the cities
in recent years in search for jobs and a better life. Moreover, a
new class of business executives has arisen, consisting of men
whose understanding of marketing and cost controls is often
deficient, but who know how to negotiate effectively with gov-
ernment officials handling military orscientific problems.
While knowing the right people or having friends in the right
places can sometimes advance the interests of an enterpriseEconomic & Social Impact of Defense Sector323
better than plain business ability, the nation's economic effi-
ciency is not likely to reap a corresponding advantage.
In any event, the economic growth of a nation is a blind
concept unless we consider what is produced as well as the
rate of growth of what happens to be produced. During the
decade from 1957 to 1966, our nation spent approximately
$520 billion on defense and space programs. This sum is almost
two-and-one-half times as large as the entire amount spent on
elementary and secondary education, both public and private.
It is two-and-three-quarter limes as large as the amount spent
on the construction of new housing units. It exceeds by over a
fourth the expenditure on new plant and equipment by the en-
tire business community—manufacturing firms, mining con-
cerns, transportation enterprises, public utilities, and all other
businesses. To be sure, an extra billion dollars' worth of bombs
or missiles will increase current production just as much as an
extra billion of new equipment for making civilian goods.
Bombs or missiles, however, add nothing to the nation's ca-
pacity to produce, while new equipment serves to augment
production in the future. The real cost of the defense sector
consists, therefore, not only of the civilian goods and services
that are currently foregone on its account; it includes also an
element of growth that could have been achieved through
larger investment in human or business capital. But even if we
assumed that the conflicting influences of the defense sector on
economic growth canceled out, its real cost is still enormous.
Unhappily, we live in dangerous times which make large na-
tional security expenditures practically unavoidable. Neverthe-
less, there are always some options in a nation's foreign and
military policy, and we therefore must be alert to the opportu-
nities that our military establishment forces us to forego. For
example, if the resources devoted to military and space activi-
ties during the past decade had been put instead to civilian324TheBusiness Cycle in a Changing Work!
uses, we could surely have eliminated urban slums, besides
adding liberally to private investment in new plant and equip-
ment as well as to both public and private investment in hu-
man capital.
HI
It follows from our analysis that the military-industrial com-
plex, of which President Eisenhower spoke so perceptively in
his farewell address, has not only been enlarging the scale of
governmental operations and thereby complicating financial
problems. By changing the thrust of economic activity and by
making the economy more dependent on government) it has
also been affecting profoundly the character of our society.
Nor have the social effects been confined to the kinds of goods
that we produce. Hopefulness about the future, optimism
about success of new undertakings, impatience to complete
satisfactorily whatever is begun—these psychological qualities
have been peculiarly American characteristics, and they ac-
count in far greater degree than we may realize for the re-
markable achievements of our economic system and the vigor
of our political democracy. These qualities are deep-rooted in
American experience and they continue to sustain us. Never-
theless, the development and spread of thermonuclear weap-
ons, the frustrations of the cold war, and now the brutal strug-
gle in Vietnam have left us, despite our awesome military
power, more anxious about our national security than our fa-
thers or grandfathers ever were.
Adults whose habits were formed in an earlier generation
may put the dangers of nuclear catastrophe out of mind by los-
ing themselves in their work or by seeking solace in religion.
That is more difficult for our children who increasingly wonder
what kind of world they have inherited by our doings. ThereEconomic & Social impact of Defense Sector325
canbe little doubt that the lively competition among the great
powers in devising instruments of terror is one of the underly-
ing causes of the restlessness of modern youth.
Moreover, young men of military age are bearing a dispro-
portionately large part of the defense burden. That is unavoid-
able at a time of war, but our generation has institutionalized
compulsory military service even when the nation is at peace.
It is undoubtedly true that many young men derive deep satis-
faction from helping to protect their country by serving as sol-
diers, sailors, or aviators. Not only that, many have also found
useful careers in the armed forces, or have benefited in their
civilian jobs from the skills and discipline acquired during mili-
tary service, or have gained a larger understanding of life by
associating with men of widely different backgrounds or by
being stationed abroad for a time. But just as these benefits de-
serve recognition, so too does the fact that the draft has by
and large proved to be a seriously upsetting factor in the lives
of young people. Not knowing when they would be called up
for military service or whether they would be accepted, many
have found themselves marking time. Those who are accepted
have often had to interrupt their schooling or careers, perhaps
alter plans with regard to marriage, and in any event be con-
tent with substantially lower pay than they could earn as a rule
in civilian work. Moreover, the administration of the draft over
the years, particularly the handling of student deferments, has
raised troublesome moral questions in the minds of young
people—and, for that matter, in the minds of older citizens as
well.
The emergence of our country as a great military power,
having world-wide political responsibilities, has also affected
our educational system. Greater emphasis on science, mathe-
matics, and modern languages in secondary schools and col-
leges, new area institutes and schools of international affairs in326TheBusiness Cycle in a Changing World
the universities, advanced courses in the esoteric languages
and customs of the Far East and Africa—these educational de-
velopments not only reflect the widening scientific and geo-
graphic interests of modem business; they are also a response
to urgent requirements of national security. But it is in the area
of research, rather than teaching, where the impact of the de-
fense establishment on our universities has been particularly
felt. Colleges, universities, and research centers associated
with universities spent in the aggregate $460 million on the
performance of research and development in 1953, with some-
thing over half of this sum financed by the federal gov-
ernment. Last year, the sum so spent was six-and-one-half
times as large, and the federally-financed portion rose to 70 per
cent. Clearly, federal funds are mainly responsible for the ex-
traordinary growth of research activities in universities, and
the chief—although by no means the sole—reason for this gov-
ernmental involvement is the intensive search for new knowl-
edge on the part of defense-related agencies. During 1963—
1966, the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, and the Space Administration together accounted for
five-eighths of the dollar value of federal grants for research
and development to institutions of higher learning, and their
proportion in immediately preceding years was even larger.
The huge influx of governmental research funds has served
to enrich the intellectual life of numerous colleges and univer-
sities, especially in the larger institutions where the grants
have been mainly concentrated. By vfrtue of research grants,
professors have better equipment to work with and more
technical assistance than they had in former limes. They also
travel more, keep in closer contact 'with their counterparts in
other universities, and mingle more freely with government
officials, business executives, and scientists working for private
industry. The gulf that previously separated a university fromEconomic & Social Impact of Defense Sector327
thelarger interests of the community and the nation has there-
fore narrowed very significantly.
However, governmental research grants have created prob-
lems for universities as well as new opportunities for useful
service. The greater interest of a faculty in research is not in-
frequently accompanied by lesser devotion to teaching. No lit-
tie part of the time set aside for research may in practice be
consumed by travel and conferences of slight scientific value.
However welcome grants from military and space agencies
may be, their concentration on the physical and engineering
sciences makes it more difficult for a university to maintain the
balance among various branches of learning that is so essential
to the intellectual and moral improvement of man. Some mili-
tary contracts involve classified research, and the secrecy
which attends such work introduces an entirely foreign note in
institutions that have traditionally taken a strong pride in com-
pletely free and uninhibited communication among scholars.
Not less serious is the tendency, which appears to be growing
among university scholars, to forsake the research to which
they are drawn by intellectual curiosity in favor of projects
that have been designed by, or contrived to suit the tastes of,
government officials or others who take care of the financing.
All universities and many of our colleges are struggling with
this and other problems that the defense sector has created or
accentuated.
The danger of diminished independence is not confined to
research activities. If college or university presidents no longer
speak out as vigorously on national issues as they did a genera-
lion or two ago, one major reason is that the institutions over
whose destiny they preside have become heavily dependent on
federal contracts and subsidies. Even professors who are bene-
filing from federal research grants or consulting relationships,
or who expect to be able to do so in the future, have been328TheBusiness Cycle in a Changing World
learning the occasional value of studied reticence. And if dis-
cretion is tempering the spirit of forthright questioning and
criticism in our universities, its power is all the stronger in the
business world. It is hardly in the interest of businessmen to
criticize their customers publicly, and by far the largest cus-
tomer of the business world is clearly the federal government
itself. Some firms sell all and many sell a good part of what
they produce to the federal government, and there are always
others that hope to be in a position to do likewise in the future.
To be sure, the great majority of business executives, even
those who manage very large enterprises, prefer commercial
markets to governmental business; but they have become so
sensitive nowadays to the regulatory powers of government
that they rarely articulate their thoughts on national issues in
public. Trade union leaders are typically more candid and out-
spoken on governmental issues than business executives; but
they too have become dependent in varying degrees on the
goodwill of government officials and therefore often deem tact
or reticence the better part of wisdom. Not only that, but it is
no longer unusual for the government in power, whether the
administration be in Democratic or Republican hands, to sug-
gest to prominent businessmen, trade union leaders, attorneys,
journalists, or university professors that they support publicly
this or that administration proposal. And men of public dis-
tinction at times comply regardless of their beliefs, perhaps be-
cause they are flattered by the attention accorded them, or be-
cause they vaguely expect some advantage from going along,
or simply because they feel that they dare not do otherwise.
Thus the gigantic size to which the federal government has
grown, for which the defense sector bears a heavy but by no
means exclusive responsibility, has been tending to erode per-
ceptibly, although not yet alarmingly, as the open discussion ofEconomic & Social Impact of Defense Sector329
thewar in Vietnam indicates, the spirit of rational and con-
structive dissent without which a democracy cannot flourish.
The huge size bf military budgets and incomplete disclosure
concerning their management carry with them also the danger
of political abuse. Since money spent in the interest of national
security necessarily has economic effects, the government in
power may sometimes be tempted to ease domestic problems
by adjusting the scale or direction of military spending. For
example, raw materials may be stockpiled beyond the minimum
military target, or the target itself may be revised upward, in
order to grant some relief to a depressed industry. Or at a time
of general economic slack, the government may begin to look
upon military spending as if it were a public works program.
Worse still, considerations of political advantage may play a
role in deciding whether contracts are placed in one area
rather than another, or with this firm instead of that. Such
practices confuse military officers, lead to waste, and might
even exacerbate international relations. Nevertheless, they are
not entirely unknown to history, including our own. Fortu-
nately, our government officials have generally been reluctant
to tamper with something so fundamental to the nation as its
defense establishment; and even on the rare occasions when
they have strayed from virtue, the sluggishness of a govern-
mental bureaucracy in carrying out any plan has kept down
the scale of mischief. But if politics is ever effectively compu-
terized, as some students believe it will be, we may have less
protection against political abuse within the defense sector in
the future.
Any enlargement of the economic power of government,
whether brought about by military expenditures or through
other causes, can eventually result in some infringement of
liberty. However, because of the sense of urgency in troubled330The Business Cycle in a Changing World
times, the requirements of national security may lead more di-
rectly to restriction of freedom. Necessary though the draft
may be, it still constitutes compulsion of the individual by the
state. Necessary though security clearances may be, they still
constitute an invasion of privacy. Necessary though passport
regulations may be, they still restrict the freedom of individu-
als to travel where they choose. Fortunately, the vitality of our
democracy has thus far proved sufficient to limit restrictions of
freedoms such as these. Not only that, it has enabled us to put
an end to the nightmare of MeCarthyism, to suppress the in-
terest of the Central Intelligence Agency in our colleges and
universities, and even to fight the war in Vietnam without im-
posing price and wage controls. We cannot take it for granted,
however, that our formidable defense establishment will not
give rise to more serious dangers to our liberties and the demo-
cratic process in the future.
Iv
Throughout the ages, philosophers and religious teachers have
lamented the horrors of war and searched for the keys to
peace. Yet theft noblest thought has been frustrated by the
course of human events. Our country has been more fortunate
than most, but we have had our share of the destruction of life
and property that is the universal coin of warfare. Every Amer-
ican of age fifty or over has lived through two world wars, the
Korean war, and now the smaller but still very costly and pro-
tracted struggle in Vietnam. When this war ends, military ex-
penditures will probably decline for a while, as they have in
fact after every war in our history. We cannot look forward,
however, to demobilization on anything like the scale experi-
enced after World War I or World War II, when the military
budget was reduced by about 90 per cent within three years.Economic & Social Impact of Defense Sector331
The reason for the difference, of course, is that the cold war
is still with us, just as it was when the Korean hostilities ended.
After the cessation of that conflict, the defense budget was re-
duced merely by a fifth. If the cost of the Vietnam war remains
at approximately the current rate, it is doubtful whether a
cease-fire will be followed by a reduction of even the Korean
magnitude. A return to the defense budget of fiscal 1964 or
1965 would indeed involve a cut of roughly 35 per cent from
this year's expenditure; but in the absence of a dramatic
change in our international relations, this is quite unlikely. In
the first place, prices are higher at present than they were in
1964 or 1965, and they will probably be higher still when the
war phases out. In the second place, it may well be necessary
for us to keep many more troops in Vietnam after a cease-fire
than was the case in Korea and also to become more heavily
involved in the task of reconstruction. In the third place, while
stocks of military equipment were built up during the Korean
war, they have been seriously depleted—particularly for the
Reserve and National Guard units—by Vietnam. They will
need to be rebuilt when hostilities come to an end, and this
demand will be reinforced by the deferred procurement of
newer models to replace equipment now in inventory.
Nevertheless, a sizable reduction of military spending will
take place in the year or two after the cease-fire, and we will
have the opportunity to concentrate more of our resources on
the arts of peace. In the past, the American economy has dem-
onstrated a remarkable ability to adjust speedily to cutbacks in
military spending, and we can be confident of doing so again.
After World War I the conversion from war to peace was car-
ried out with only a mild and brief setback in total economic
activity. The like happened after World War II, despite the
fact that more than two-fifths of our nation's resources were
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and 1946, spending on the manufacture of defense goods
dropped drastically and the number of men in the armed
forces declined from 11.5 million to 3.5 million. Nevertheless,
the unemployment rate remained below 4 per cent. The termi-
nation of the Korean war was followed by a recession but the
return of peace was not its sole cause. En any event, unemploy-
ment during this recession was less serious at its worst than
during the recession which came just before or just after it.
With the experience that our country has gained during the
past two decades in coping with economic fluctuations, with
both the Executive and the Congress obviously eager to pre-
vent unemployment, and with plans for dealing with post-
Vietnam problems already beginning to take shape, there
should not be much difficulty in adjusting federal tax, expendi-
ture, and credit policies so as to maintain aggregate monetary
demand at the level needed to assure reasonably full employ-
ment when hostilities cease. Some sizable adjustments will still
need to be made by numerous communities and industries; but
even they should prove manageable since the military cut-
backs are likely to be largely concentrated on items produced
by business firms that are closely oriented to our diversified
and resilient civilian markets.
The highly specialized aerospace, electronics, and communi-
cations industries will probably not bear much of the burden
of post-Vietnam cutbacks. Indeed, once the curve of military
spending turns upward again, as it well may two or three years
after the cease-fire, these are the very industries that are likely
to benefit most from the dynamism of modem technology. To
maintain a sufficient strategic superiority to deter any ag-
gressor, we have been devoting vast sums to research and de-
velopment, as I have already noted. The fantastic new weap-
ons and weapon systems devised by our scientists and engi-
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themselveswere new and revolutionary only a short time ago.
But until the new devices are ready, those that were only re-
cently new cannot be abandoned and may even need to be
augmented. Meanwhile, strategic concepts may shift, as they
did during the sixties from reliance on massive nuclear deter-
rents to developing a capability for limited warfare and coun-
terinsurgency operations. One way or another, therefore, costs
tend to multiply all around. The Soviet Union, of course, will
not stand still while our military prowess increases. On the
contrary, it is striving through a remarkably enterprising and
inventive military-industrial complex of its own to establish
military parity, if not actual supremacy. For example, we have
recently learned of the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile
system around Moscow and Leningrad, of a novel ship-to-ship
missile of Russian origin fired in the Mediterranean, and of
the apparent development of an orbital bomb capability by the
Soviet Union. Communist China has also been developing, and
with greater speed than was generally anticipated, the ability
to make and deliver sophisticated weapons. En turn, our mili-
tary establishment, besides innovating vigorously on its own,
keeps devising countermeasures to what the Russians or Chi-
nese have or may have in hand. Both its reaction and its fresh
challenge to potential aggressors can be expected to become
stronger once Vietham no longer requires top priority.
As we look beyond the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, we
therefore need to recognize that the scale of defense expendi-
hires has, to a significant degree, become a self-reinforcing
process. Its momentum derives not only from the energy of
military planners, contractors, scientists, and engineers. To
some degree it is abetted also by the practical interests and
anxieties of ordinary citizens. Any announcement that a partic-
ular defense installation will be shut down, or that a particular
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among men and women who, however much they abhor war
and its trappings, have become dependent for their livelihood
on the activity whose continuance is threatened. With a large
part of our economy devoted to defense activities, the military-
industrial complex has thus acquired a constituency including
factory workers, clerks, secretaries, even grocers and barbers.
Local politicians and community leaders may not find it easy
to plead for the extension of activities that no longer serve a
military purpose. Many, nevertheless, manage to overcome
such scruples. Indeed, candidates for the Congress have been
known to claim that they are uniquely qualified to ward off
military closings or even to bring new contracts to their dis-
tricts, and their oratory has not gone unrewarded by the elec-
torate. The vested interest that numerous communities have
acquired in defense activities may therefore continue to run up
costs on top of the rising budgets generated by the momentum
of competing military technologies.
If this analysis is at all realistic, the military-industrial com-
plex will remain a formidable factor in our economic and social
life in the calculable future. It will continue to command a
large, possibly even an increasing, part of our resources. It will
continue to strain federal finances. It will continue to test the
vigor of our economy and the vitality of our democratic insti-.
tutions. It will continue to confuse understanding by suggest-
ing to many foreign citizens, as it sometimes does even to our
own, that our national prosperity is based on huge military
spending, when in fact we could be much more prosperous
without it. For all these reasons, while we need to recognize the
high and honorable national purpose of our military-industrial
complex, we also need to remain continually vigilant of its ac-
tivities and seek to protect ourselves against its possible abuses,
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business monopolies and as we are beginning to protect our-
selves against labor monopolies.
V
The scale and activities of our defense sector are now being
subjected to a searching public discussion. Two major schools
of political thought have become locked in a contest for the
mind and soui of America. One school draws much of its
strength from the revolution of military technology, the other
from the revolution of rising expectations. One school tends to
regard communism as a centrally directed conspiracy that
threatens our survival as a free people. The other school be-
lieves that communism is breaking up into independent na-
tional movements, and sees the main threat to free institutions
in the deterioration of our cities and the sickness of our society.
One school seeks overwhelming military power to deter fresh
Communist adventures, and is willing to risk war in order to
prevent the geographic expansion of communism. The other
school seeks wider social justice and better economic condi-
tions for Negroes and others who have not participated fully in
the advance of prosperity, and holds that the force of moral
example can contribute more to our national security than ad-
ditional bombs or missiles.
Both schools have focused attention on the federal budget
and neither has been satisfied by the treatment accorded its
claims. From 1955 to 1965, federal spending on nondefense
activities increased faster than spending on defense. Since
then, defense expenditures have gone up more rapidly, though
not much more rapidly. Looking to the future, professional
economists never tire of pointing out that our growing econ-
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needed,also more guns, even as we have been managing to do
while the war in Vietnam is being waged. Theft reassurance,
however, does not satisfy those who feel that our national se-
curity requires not just more guns, but many more guns, and
that we therefore need to give up some of our butter. Nor does
it satisfy those who feel that we need not just more butter, but
much more butter, and that our statistics of the gross national
product are misleading us by their failure to allow for the poi-
lution of our water, the poisons in our air, the noise of our
streets, the rats in our slums, the Holing in our cities, and the
destruction of life on our highways. Debate along these lines
has reached a high pitch of intensity and even bitterness as the
war in Vietnam has dragged out. It has become a divisive
force, and it has brought anguish to our people. Its effect on
the conduct of the war, however, is likely to count for less than
its effect on the general direction of our foreign and military
policy in the future.
For the debate is demonstrating to thoughtTfixl citizens that
our national security depends not only on awesome military
forces. It depends also on the strength of our economic system,
on the wholesomeness of our social and political life, and par-
ticularly on how well governmental objectives express the na-
tional will and purpose. As this lesson sinks in, we will want to
try far harder than we ever have, both in our personal capacity
and through our government, to bring the armaments race un-
der decent control. And if the cracks of freedom within the
Communist system of tyranny widen, as they well may in com-
ing decades, we can count on being joined in this quest by the
people of the Soviet Union and eventually by the people of
mainland China as well. That, at any rate, is the only real basis
for hope of saving ourselves and the entire human family from
catastrophe.